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JURISDICTION
Appellants

Ingersolls

appeal

an

entry

of

final

judgment

denying their motion to intervene dated September 4, 1986, R-146.
Appellant

Patterson

appeals

an

entry

of

final

judgment

granting Respondent Interstate Land's motion for summary judgment
against Appellant Patterson dated September 4, 1986. R-149.
Appellants
"Memorandum
Murphy,

ingersolls

Opinion

District

and

and

Patterson

Order"

Judge,

by

dated

the

appeal

Honorable

December

2,

from

the

Michael

R.

1986,

denying

Appellants motions to correct the previous orders of September 4,
1986. R-177.
Notice of appeal was timely
R-187.

Hence

this Court

has

filed on December 30, 1986.
jurisdiction

over

this matter

pursuant to Art. VIIIf § 9 of the Utah Constitution

Rule 3,

U.R.A.P., as well as Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (1953) (amended
1987) .

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I.

APPELLANTS' OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY IN QUESTION
A.

Whether each of the four Ingersolls and Patterson are the

owners of an undivided 1/5 interest in and to said property in
question?
B.

Whether

Appellants

at

Ingersolls

all

times

and/or

from

and

Patterson

after
have

October, 1977
been

in actual

physical possession of and have visibly, openly, notoriously,
- 1 -

continually

possessed

and used

the disputed property under a

claim of title and ownership thereto?
C.

Whether Appellants Ingersolls are "purchasers" within the

meaning of § 78-12-13, UCA, 1953?
D.

Whether the trial court's granting of summary judgment

against

in

favor

of

Respondent

Interstate

Land

and

against

Appellant Patterson was proper?

II.

APPELLANTS' (INGERSOLLS) MOTION TO INTERVENE
A.

Whether the trial court erred in not allowing Ingersolls

to intervene in the action below?
B.

Whether Ingersolls are necessary parties and/or whether

their property rights are effected by the lower court's orders?

III.

APPEAL OF ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A.

Whether

Ingersoll's

Rule

59

U.R.Civ.P

motion

was

proper?
B.

Whether the lower court erred in holding that a trial

must be held before a Rule 59 U.R.Civ.P motion may be brought?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to establish title and ownership of certain

real property.

The disputed property is West half of Glendale

Avenue and the South half of First South Street, West of 1100
- 2 -

West in Salt Lake City, Utah, dedicated streets located in Blocks
43, 44, 53 and 54 of Plat "C" of the Salt Lake County Survey in
Salt Lake County, Utah, as vacated by the City of Salt Lake by an
ordinance passed by the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City,
Utah on October 5, 1977. (Copy of vacation ordinance 172 attached
as Exhibit I; copy of vacation ordinance 173 attached as Exhibit
II).
Respondent

Interstate

Land

Corporation

("INTERSTATE

LAND")

brought this action seeking to quiet title to the disputed real
property described above. R-2.

II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
On December

14, 1978, Salt

Lake

City

Corporation

filed a

complaint against Mountain Fuel Supply in case no. C-78-7764, a
predecessor
filed

as

action to the case below.
a

result

of

Salt

Lake

City

T-198.

The lawsuit was

vacating

the

disputed

property through Salt Lake City Ordinances 172 and 173 described
above and then passing an ordinance to undo the said vacation,
and was

filed

to determine

described above.

ownership to the disputed

property

T-197-198.

Appellants Ingersolls as well as the Lemel Corporation, filed
a motion to intervene
motion for summary

minute

entry

III) and Mountain Fuel filed a

judgment against Appellants as well as Salt

Lake City Corporation.
by

(Exhibit

T-197 (Exhibit IV).

Mountain

Fuel
- 3 -

Supply's

On August 31, 1982
motion

for

summary

judgment against interveners was granted.
the

court

granted

Mountain

Fuel's

On September 13 f 1982,

Motion

for

summary

judgment

against Appellants' Ingersolls and Lemel Corporation for failure
to

attend

the

judgment.
Mountain
City,

on

Mountain

Fuel's

motion

for

summary

(Exhibit V ) . On December 23, 1983, the court granted
Fuel's motion

holding

above-described
described

hearing

in

that

for

summary

Ordinances

172

judgment

against

and

which

173

Salt

Lake

vacated

the

property were valid and that title to the land
each

of

the

ordinances

vested

in

the

abutting

landowners. (Exhibit V I ) .
Respondent

Interestate

Land

brought

the

present

action

seeking to quiet title to the disputed vacated portions of the
streets as described above.
to the vacated portions
while. Appellants
the vacated

R-2.

of the disputed property

Patterson

portions

Interstate Land claims title

and

vested

in it

Ingersoll allege that title to

of the disputed

property

vested

in them.

R-4, R-116.
Respondent Interstate Land moved for summary judgment against
Appellant Patterson. R-85.
Judge

Fishier, granted

Summary

Judgment

and

motion to intervene*

By minute entry dated July 28, 1986,

Respondent
summarily

R-144.

Interstate
denied

Land's motion for

Appellants

Ingersolls'

The respective orders representing

the above holding were signed by Judge Daniels on September 4,
1986. R-146, R-149.

Appellants Patterson and Ingersolls brought

a motion to correct the order on September 13, 1986. R-154.
- 4 -

Said

motion was denied by the "Memorandum Order and Opinion" of Judge
Murphy dated December 2, 1986. R-177. (Exhibit VII). This appeal
followed. R-187.

III.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The disputed
be part

property, ("VACATED STREET PROPERTY") used to

of First

South

Street

and part of Glendale streetf

a

north-south street which intersects with First South between 1100
and

1200

West.

R-86.

Said

property

is more

particularly

described:
(a)

in a copy of the trust deed attached as Exhibit "A" to

Respondent's complaint in the action below; R-17.
(b)

in the quit-claim

deed

of July 27, 1979 from

Lemel

Corporation ("LEMEL") to Appellant Patterson; R-125.
(c)

as parcels # 8 and 9 in the Trustees Deed of June 3,

1982 from NACM International

("NACM") to General Brewing Company

("GENERAL BREWING"); R-126.
(d) also shown in the plot map. R-84, R-129.
The disputed property was the West half of Glendale Avenue
and the South half of First South Streets, West of 1100 West in
Salt Lake City, Utahf

as vacated

by the City of Salt Lake by

ordinance passed by the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City
on October 5 f 1977. (Exhibits I & II).
Salt

Lake

78-7764

City

Corporation

resolved

v. Mountain

the issue

that

- 5 -

The predecessor case of
Fuel

Supply, Case No.

the ordinances

vacating the

vacated

street

property

were

valid

and

that

title

to

said

property vested in the abutting landowners.
At the time that said streets were vacated each of the four
Ingersolls were the owners of an undivided 1/5 and and Lemel was
the

owner

of

an

undivided

1/5

of

the

real

property

("ABUTTING PROPERTY") the disputed property.
October,

1977,

physical

possession

continuously
claim

of

Ingersolls
of

possessed

title

and

and

and
and

Patterson

have
used

ownership

At all time from

have

visibly,

been

openly,

the disputed

thereto, which

abutting

in

actual

notoriously,

property
claim

under a

has

at all

times been hostile and adverse to the claims of all persons and
organizations,

including

the

claims

of

Interstate

and

of

the

persons and organizations through whom Interstate claims to have
derived

its title. By operation

of law when said streets were

vacated fee title to an undivided 1/5 of the disputed property
reverted to and vested in each of the four Ingersolls and Lemel.
R-117.
interest

Lemel
in

thereafter

and

to

the

conveyed

its undivided

disputed

property

to

1/5

ownership

Patterson

by

a

quit-claim deed. R-125.
The abutting property was pledged by Ingersolls and Lemel as
security for an obligation owed by them to General Brewing by a
trust deed executed in July, 1977. R-132.
before

the

vacating

ordinances

were

Said pledge was made

determined

to

be

valid.

The disputed property was not pledged as security for said debt
by said trust deed.

After acquisition of title to the disputed
- 6 -

property

(May, 1980) Ingersolls conveyed their

interest

in the

abutting property to Lemel by quit-claim deed, R-137, and Lemel
thereupon

became

owner

of

100%

of

the

abutting

property.

Ingersolls did not convey the disputed property to Lemel.
Lemel failed to pay the obligation secured by the trust deed,
R-132, and General

Brewing

caused

a notice of default of said

trust deed

to be filed about September, 1979, R-139.

notice

default

of

General

Brewing

asserted

no

In said

claim

to

the

bankruptcy

in

the

disputed property.
Thereafter,

Lemel

filed

a

petition

in

United States District Court for the District
Division,

case

No.

80-00755.

The

disputed

of Utah, Central
property

was

not

listed as an asset of Lemel in the bankruptcy. (Exhibit VIII).
In that bankruptcy, NACM was appointed as trustee of Lemel.
By a "Trustees Deed" R-126 NACM sold and conveyed the abutting
property
disputed

(parcels

#1

property

through

(parcels

7)

and

purported

to

sell

the

#8 and 9) to General Brewing. NACM

appeared before the U.S. Bankruptcy Judge, representing that the
vacated

street

property

had

been

erroneously

legal description in the Trustee's Notice.
street

property

rather

was

was never deeded

held

by

omitted

the

Title to the vacated

to the bankruptcy

Appellants.

from

Based

Lemel, but

upon

NACM's

representations, the Bankruptcy Court held that NACM could convey
the vacated street property, which it allegedly did to General
Brewing.

R-46.

The General Brewing then
- 7 -

purported to convey

the disputed property to Interstate by a special warranty deed
R-61.
Respondent claims as remote grantee under that trust deed
foreclosure through the bankruptcy court and acquired no better
title to the disputed parcel than

the title of General Brewing.

Since General Brewing never had a trust deed covering, or other
interest in the disputed property, plaintiff acquired no interest
in and to the disputed parcel and cannot now assert a quiet-title
thereto.

The

first

mention

of

the

disputed

property

in

plaintiff's chain of title is when the bankruptcy trustee added
the disputed property to the description of the abutting property
sold by the trustee.
acquired

Ingersolls

corporation

had

Since the bankrupt corporation had never
4/5

deeded

interest
its

1/5

in

the

interest

property,
to

and

the

Patterson,

the

bankrupt corporation did not have title to the disputed property
the trustee acquired no title when he could convey to plaintiff.
Accordingly, plaintiff acquired nothing by that conveyance.
Since Lemel did not have title to the disputed property R-126
conveyed nothing to General Brewing and the deed from General
Brewing

to

Interstate

However, said

deeds

R-61

cloud

conveyed

nothing

Appellants' title

to

Interestate.

to the disputed

property.

STATEMENT OP RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Court should quiet title to a 1/5 interest in and to the
- 8 -

disputed property in the names of each of the Ingersolls and
Patterson, and declare that Interstate has no right, title or
interest therein.

Further, the Court should rule that it is

appropriate for Appellants to bring a Rule 59 U.R.Civ.P motion
from an order granting summary judgment.

SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT

Appellants Patterson and Ingersolls contend that they hold
title to the vacated street property and are the lawful owners
thereof.

Appellants contend that they have owned the adjoining

and abutting property to the vacated street property when said
property was vacated and that title to said property properly
vested in them pursuant to § 78-12-13, UCA, 1953 as amended.
In the alternative, Appellants allege title and ownership to the
disputed vacated street property through the doctrine of adverse
possession.
Appellants

claim

ownership

of

said

property

by

adverse

possession Factual issues concerning adverse possession require a
trial and cannot properly be determined on a motion for summary
judgment.

Ingersolls should be permitted to intervene and the

summary judgment against Patterson should be reversed and they
should be permitted to litigate their quiet-title claim against
plaintiff.

- 9 -

Appellants Patterson and Ingersolls contend that the trial
court erred in not allowing them to intervene in the actions
below.

Appellants

further

contend

that

they

are

parties and that the disposition of this action

necessary

impairs and

impedes their property rights and interests.
Appellants Patterson and Ingersolls contend that a motion
under

Rule

59

U.R.Civ.P.

is appropriate

granting summary judgment.

following

an order

Appellants finally contend that a

full trial is not a necessary predicate act to bringing a motion
under Rule 59 U.R.Civ.P.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.

A.

APPELLANTS OWN THE VACATED STREET PROPERTY

Appellants each owned 1/5

property in 1977.

interest in vacated street

The undisputed facts demonstrate that the

Appellants and each of them owned an undivided 1/5 interest to
and to said property in 1977f having purchased said property and
giving a trust deed back to Backman Abstract & Title Company, as
trustee on July 6, 1977.
B.

R-87

Utah is a lien not a title theory state.

The trustee

under the trust deed which described the abutting property (the
trust

deed

did

not

include

the

disputed

property

in

the

description of the property pledged under the trust deed) was not
the "owner of record" of the abutting property.
- 10 -

The "owner" of

real property is the record owner.

A trustee under a trust deed

holds only a lien or security interest in the property by reason
of the trust deed and is not the "owner" so as to vest ownership
of the vacated street in the trustee under the trust deed. Bybee
v. Stuart, 112 Utah 462, 189 P.2d
U.S. v. Loosley, 551 P.2d

506

Property Law, Vol 1 § 9.36.

118

(1948) ;See generally,

(1976); Summary

of Utah Real

Appellants recognize that these

citations refer to mortgages and that no known Utah cases refer
to

Deeds

of

Trust,

although

it

is

believed

that

the same

principal of law applies to trust deeds as to mortgages.
When the street was vacated ownership of said street vested
in

Ingersolls

property.

and

Lemel, the

Carrying

the

record

Court's

owners of

decision

to

the abutting
its

logical

conclusion, had the trust deed covering the adjacent property
been paid and the trust deed released, the trustee would still be
the "owner" of the vacated street, a completely illogical and
incorrect result.
C.

Ingersolls conveyance to corporation did not include

conveyance of title to the vacated street.

The Court erred in

adopting as a finding of fact 1f 14, R-89, thereof in that the
Court

improperly

determined

that

Ingersolls

"quit-claimed

to

Lemel Corporation whatever right, title or interest they may have
had in the same real property described in the July 6, 1977 Trust
Deed."
disputed

Said quit-claim deed and trust deed did not include the
property

in

the

legal
- 11 -

description

of

the property

pledged or conveyed.

See R-132.

Accordinglyf said finding of

fact is incorrect and misleading, should be corrected, and as a
consequence the holding of the court should be changed.
D.

Bankruptcy Trustee did not own vacated street and attempt

to convey same was a nullity.
and

18,

R-90,

without

The Court erred in adopting 1[ 17

adding

thereto

the

finding

and/or

conclusion that since 4/5 ownership of the vacated street was not
conveyed to Lemel by Ingersolls and since Lemel had conveyed its
1/5

interest

bankruptcy

in said vacated

was filedf

street to Patterson before the

Lemel had no ownership

in the vacated

street and that the trustees1 deed purporting to convey title to
the vacated street was a nullity.
E.
order

Appellants acquired title by adverse possession.
to state a valid

required

claim

to, but failed

In

for quiet-title Respondent was

to allege that plaintiff

and/or

its

grantor were "seized or possessed of the property in question
within seven years" as required by 78-12-5, 78-12-6,et seq.,
UCA, 1953. Plaintiff did not (and cannot truthfully) make such
allegations

and

therefore

is precluded

from

summary

judgment

quieting title.
Appellants claim adverse possession of the disputed property,
and

issues

of

fact with

respect

to said

adverse

possession

bars

plaintiff's

preclude summary judgment.
P.

Statute

of

Ingersolls' complaint

limitations
in

intervention
- 12 -

claims.

(third defense) asserts

that plaintiff's claim is time barred.

R-118.

Issues of fact

concerning that defense precludes summary judgment.

The same

issues are applicable to Patterson.
G.

Waiver

intervention

and

Ingersolls1

estoppel

complaint

in

asserts the defenses of waiver and estoppel. R-118.

If for any reason the vacated street was included in the property
pledged as security under the trust deed (which we deny), the
holder of the trust deed waived its right to assert said claim by
failing to include that property in the trust deed foreclosure
and/or

by

reason thereof

said trust deed holder

and persons

claiming through the trust deed holder are estopped to now assert
a claim to said property.

Fact issues concerning those matters

precludes summary judgment.

The same issues are applicable to

Patterson.

POINT II. APPELLANTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO INTERVENE

A.

Intervention as a matter of right.

Since Ingersolls claim an interest in the property in dispute
they should have been permitted to intervene as provided in
24(a)(3),

24(b)(1),

24(b)(2),

24(c),

URCP.

See

R-112.

Ingersolls were unfairly taken by surprise at the hearing on the
motion for permission to intervene by plaintiff's argument that
their right to intervene might be affected by the holding in
another case involving these parties.
B.

Intervention

is

appropriate

- 13 -

Appellants

are

indispensible

parties,

their

intervention

involves

identical

issues of fact and law.
Finally,

should

this

Court

rule

that

intervention

was

properly denied. Appellants will be forced to file yet another
lawsuit

against

matter.

Respondent's

for

Such an action would

a

not

final

resolution

result

in judicial

of

this

economy.

Therefore, the matter should be resolved here and now.
To

Appellants1

deny

motion

to

intervene

under

the

circumstances was error which should be corrected by permitting
them

to

intervene,

counterclaim,
appropriate

bring

requiring
the

matter

determination

intervention
application

is
for

intervention

to

plaintiff

deny

in

the

issue,

of

respond
then

by

to

their

making

usual

fashion.

To

due

process.

When

procedural

intervention

as a matter

to

to

an
deny
the

is made timely, this rule permits
right when

the applicant

will be

adversely affected by the trial court's disposition of property.
Jenner

v.

Real

Estate

Services,

659

P.2d

1072

(Utah,

1983) ,

particularly where inteverner's interests will not be adequately
represented.
overruling,

Lima
Kesler

1972) . Intervention
lose

by

direct

v.

Chambers,

v. Tate, 28
was allowed
legal

657
U.2d
when

operation

P.2d

279

355, 502

P.2d

inteverner
and

(Utah,

effect

565

might
of

1982)
(Utah,

gain or
judgment.

Commercial Block Realty Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co., 83 U. 414, 28 P.2d 1081.
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C. Order denying intervention appealable
Ingersolls believe that a review of said other case (Salt
Lake

City

Corporation

v.

Mountain

Fuel

Supply,

Case

No.

C-78-7764) shows that the decision in said case does not affect
their

right to intervene herein.

The Court did not state a

reason for denial of the motion to intervene, so it is uncertain
as to whether
denial.

or not that case was a consideration in such

(Exhibit V) .

Such a decision is appealable under the

reasoning and holding of Tracy v. University of Utah Hospital,
619 P.2d 340 (Utah, 1980) as well as

Commercial

Block Realty

Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 83 U. 414, 28 P.2d
1081; See also Tripp v. District Court of Third Judicial Dist.,
89 U. 8, 56 P.2d 1355.
D.

Intervention proper and appropriate

Since Ingersolls claim ownership of the parcel of property,
title to which is herein sought to be quieted, they should be
entitled to intervene, the issues should be framed, and the Court
would then be in a position to properly rule on those matters
after affording Ingersolls the right to participate in discovery.
Intervention
indispensable

is properly
party,

denied where

intervention

would

inteverner
unduly

was not an

delay

pending

action or complicate issues, and his rights could be protected in
independent action. Houston Real Estate Inv. Co. v. Hechler, 44
U. 64, 138 P. 1159;

Dayton v. Free, 49 U. 221, 162 P. 614. None

of those situations exist here, which would deny Appellants the
opportunity to intervene.
- 15 -

POINT III.

ROLE 59 U.R.Civ.P MOTION IS PROPER FOLLOWING ORDER

GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A.

Rule 59 U.R.Civ.P to be liberally construed

Federal

Rule 59 differs substantially

from URCP 59. FRCP

59(a)(1) speaks of a new trial following a jury trial and FRCP
59(a)(2)

speaks

of

an

action

tried

without

a

juryf

which

strongly suggest that under Federal Procedure Rule 5 9 may only
apply after there has been a formal trial with live witnesses.
Notwithstanding that limiting language, many Federal Courts have
held that a FRCP 59 motion will lie following a summary judgment
(see

cases

cited

below).

URCP

59(a)

omits

that

language

concerning a jury or non-jury trial, and simply states that:
"a new trial may be granted to all or any of
the parties on all or part of the issues, for
any of the following causes:"
B.

Summary judgment is a "Trial.

59(a)does
situations
witnesses.

not

suggest

where

there

that

its

has

been

UnlikeFRCP 59(a), URCP

application
a

formal

is

limited

trial

with

to
live

A summary judgment is a URCP 59 "trial" based upon

the record and is appropriate only where there are no disputed
issues of fact which

require live testimony.

The resulting

summary judgment has the same force and effect as a judgment
after hearing live witnesses.

URCP 59 should be construed in

such a manner as to permit the court to review and correct its
judgment, so as to avoid an unnecessary
- 16 -

appeal, whether the

judgment resulted from summary judgment or from a trial, since
such a decision is a final decision on the merits.

See Ray E.

Friedman & Co. v. Jenkinsf 824 F.2d 657, 660 (8th Cir.f 1987); In
Vreeken v. Davis, 718 F.2d

343

(10th Cir., 1983), the 10th

Circuit upheld Judge Jenkins1 decision the Utah District Court
concluding that regardless of how it is styled or construed, a
motion filed within ten days of the entry of judgment questioning
the correctness of a judgment is properly treated as a Rule
59(e) motion.
C.

Federal

persuasive.

cases

relied

upon

by Judge Murphy are not

Judge Murphy cites Federal District Court decisions

from Florida and Virginia, R-183, in support of his position that
URCP 59 may not be used unless there has been a formal trial, but
acknowledges that cases from the 6th and 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals (cited on pages 7 and 8 of the Court's memorandum, R-183
to R-184) hold that FRCP 59 may be used in summary judgment
situations where there has been no formal trial.

Other federal

cases holding that FRCP 59(e) is a proper procedural vehicle to
be used by a party seeking to vacate summary judgment even though
there has been not trial of the matter, include Parks v. "Mr.
Ford",

678 FRD 305 (DC Pa, 1975);

Samuel C. Ennis & Co. v.

Woodmar Realty Co. 89 FRD 136 (ND 111 1981) . The cases which
permit a Rule 59 motion after summary judgment appear to be
better reasoned and more persuasive.
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D. Utah law allows a URCP 59 motion after summary judgment.
Judge Murphy attempts to distinguish this Court's decision in
Hume v. Small Claims Court of Murray, 590 P2d 309, 310-311 (Utah
1979) f where this Court held that a URCP 59(a) motion may be
used for the purpose of reversing a judgment denying a writ of
mandamus, by stating that it is "instructive but not controlling
in the context of a summary

judgment".

In Humef

supra, an

action for a writ of mandate was filed in the District Court
seeking to compel the small claims court to honor an appeal that
had been filed within 5 days after Hume learned of the default
judgment

(arguing that the appeal time did not commence until

notice of judgment), but after the 5 days specified in 78-6-10,
UCA, 1953 for taking an appeal, after entry of the small claims
judgment.

The District Court denied the application for a writ

of mandate and Hume filed a URCP 59 motion for a new trial or to
alter or amend the judgment denying the application for the writ.
The District Court also denied the URCP 59 motion on grounds
that it was not the proper procedure.
argued

On appeal the Respondent

(in the same manner as Respondents argue in support of

their motion for summary disposition herein) that the URCP 59
rule did not extend the time for appeal on the merits, that the
appeal on the merits was not timely, and that the only matter
before the Supreme Court was the issue of denial of the URCP 59
motion.

The Supreme Court disagreed, held that an appeal from

small claims court could be made within 5 days after notice of
judgment, and that a URCP 59 motion was properly used under those
- 18 -

circumstances, and stated that (590 P.2d 309 at 311):
"A timely motion under Rule 59 terminates the
running of the time for appeal of a judgment.
Time for appeal does not begin to run again until
the order granting or denying such a motion is
entered. The effect of denying such a motion is
to reinstate the original judgment, and a timely
appeal taken therefrom is in reality an appeal
from that original judgment."
E. The decision in Hume allows ORCP 59 motion following
summary judgment.

In Hume, suprathere was no formal trial, but

only a "hearing" where petitioner testified that she had received
no notice of the default judgment.

Whether such testimony is

given in open court or by affidavit should not alter the rights
of a party. URCP 1(a) provides:

"That they

(Rules) shall be

liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action."
to

review

and

correct

its order

Permitting the District Court
following

summary

judgment

instead of requiring an appeal to the Supreme Court to correct an
error complies with the mandate of URCP 1.

The same principal of

law is applicable in our case as in Hume, supra.

Under Utah law,

a URCP 59 motion is not limited to cases where there has been a
formal trial.

To hold to the contrary would be contrary to the

mandate of URCP 1(a) and would require reversal of the holding in
Hume, supra.

In a like manner, appellants URCP 59 motion in the

present case terminated the running of the time for appeal, which
time

resumed when that motion was denied. Accordingly, this

appeal, both on the merits of the case and based upon Judge
- 19 -

Murphey's

denial

of Appellants' URCP 59 motion, is properly

before the Court and is timely.
F.

Objection to a proposed order under local Rule 2.9 are

limited to the form, not substance of the order.

Judge Murphy

argues

of an order

that

failure

to object to the substance

somehow constitutes a waiver of the right to file a URCP 59
motion. We disagree.

Local Rule 2.9(b) contemplates objections

being made to proposed
announced decision.
suggests

that

orders which differ

from the Court's

There is nothing in Local Rule 2.9 which

it may

be

used

as

a vehicle

to contest

the

substance of the Court's decision, which more properly should be
contested

by

a URCP

59

motion.

Local

Rule

2.9

does not

contemplate objections going to the merits of the Court's ruling,
the filing of memorandums, or oral argument.

It is simply a

procedure rule designed to assure that the court's decision is
properly worded to accurately states the substance of the Court's
ruling.

If Local Rule 2.9 is to be expanded in such a manner it

should be done by an amendment to the rule, not by a judicial
decision.
G.

The fact that other procedures might have been employed

in effort to persuade court is not waiver of rights under ORCP
59.

The

fact

that

Appellants

might

have

filed

further

memorandums at an earlier time (page 9 of memo opinion, R-185)
does not deprive Appellants of their right to move for a new
trial or to correct the judgment under URCP 59.
- 20 -

The purposes of

a URCP 59 motion is to give the Court an opportunity to correct
errors to avoid the necessity of an appeal.
H.

Resignation

of

Judge

Fishier

should

not

affect

Appellants1 rights. But for the resignation of Judge Fishier the
URCP 59 motion would have been heard by him.

Appellants are at

a disadvantage over which they had no control because the case
was transferred to a new judge who was less familiar with the
case. Change of judges should not affect Appellants' right to
file and argue their URCP 59 motion before taking an appeal or
their right to appeal.
CONCLUSION
Meritorious

issues

conclusionary
memorandums

remain

statement

were

not

that

filed

for

appeal.

because

in opposition

Respondent's

affidavits

and/or

to the motion for

summary judgment there is allegedly no dispute in the record as
to any material factf is incorrect.

Counter-affidvits are not

necessary where the dispute is a matter of record.

The issues

raised

Appellants

by

this

appeal

are

meritorius,

involving

property rights to the vacated street property as well as their
right to bring a Rule 59 Motion.
For the foregoing reasons/ Appellants move this Court for an
order remanding granting the relief prayed for.

Dated the

17th day of November, 1987.

>

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused 4 copies of the foregoing to
be hand-delivered this 17th day of November, 1987, pursuant to
Rule 26(b) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure to:
Patrick J. 0'Hara, Esq.,Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy,
50 South Main Street #1600, Salt Lake City, Utah 84144

Larr'y L.^Whyte"
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ADDENDUM
A. EXHIBITS

Ordinance Vacating Street, Bill no 172

Exhibit I

STATE OF UTAH,
City and County of Salt Lake,
If

\
[ ss.
)

Mildred V. Higham

, City Recorder of Salt Lake City, Utah, do hereby

certify that the attached document is a full, true and correct copy of

B i l l No. 172 of 1977*

vacating F i r s t South Street between..iMO...W.est....Sjt.i:ee.t..iand...XlO.Q...Wes.t
l o c a t e d in Salt Lake City, Utah.

passed by the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City, Utah,

October 5,

19 77

as appears of record in my office.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the corporate seal of said
City, this
(SEAL)

?lst

. day of

December

19.7.8..

City Recorder

mm ORDINANCE
AN OROINANCE VACATI NG First South Street between 1000 West Street and UOO
West Street located in Salt Lake
City, Utah.
Be it ordained by the Board of
Commissioners of Salt Lake
City, Utah:
SECTION 1. That First South
Street between 1000 West Street
and 1100 West Street located in
Salt Lake City, Utah, more
particularly described as follows, be. and the same hereby
is. vacated and declared no
longer to be public property for
use as a street, avenue, alley or
pedestrian way:
Beginning at the Southeast
corner of Lot 1, Block 53. Plat
"C", Salt Lake City Survey,
said point also being the Northwest corner of 1000 West Street
and First South Street, and
running thence South 132.06
feet; thence West 4*0.00 feet;
thence North 132.09feet; thence
East 6*0.00 feet to point of
beginning. Contains 87.169.5
SQuare feet, or 2.001 acres.
Said vacation is made expressly subiect to all existing
rights of way and easements of
all public utilities of any and
every description now located
on. in, under or over the
confines of the above described
property, and also subiect to
the rights of entry thereon for
the purpose of maintaining,
altering, repairing, replacing,
removing or rerouting said
utilities and all of them.
SECTION 2. This ordinance
shall take effect 30 days after
its first publication.
Passed by the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City,
Utah, this 5th day of October,
1977.
TED L. WILSON
MAYOR
MILDRED V.HIGHAM
CITY RECORDER
(SEAL)
BILL NO. 172 of 1977
Published October 15.1977 < B-9>

Ordinance Vacating Street, Bill no 173

Exhibit II

STATE OF UTAH,
ss.
City and County of Salt Lake,
I,

Mi

l d r e d V. H i g h a m

#

aty

Re C o r d e r

of

g^ ^ ^

certify that the attached document is a full, true and correct copy of
ordinanc

?.vacatin8

Glend

City>

utah

do

hereby

B i l l No. 173, an

a l e and F i r s t South S t r e e t s west of llflO West

S t r e e t located i n . S a l t Lake .City J ..Utah.

passed by the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City, Utah,

October 5,

1977

as appears of record in my office.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the corporate seal of said
City, this
(SEAL)

2.ist

day of

December

1978-

\/^UJJAL£:J:,//(JJ^
/
RHHKK«X^

n c....

City Recorder

AN ORDINANCE
AN ORDINANCE VACATING Glendale and First South
Streets west of 1100 West Street
located in Salt Lake City, Utah.
Be it ordained by the Board of
Commissioners of Salt Lake
C1tv, Utah:
SECTION 1. That Glendale
and First Sooth Streets west of
1100 West Street located in Salt
Lake City, Utah, more particularly described as follows, be,
and Itm same hereby is, vacated and declared no longer to
be public property for use as a
street, ay^nue, alley or pedestrian way:
Beginning at the Southeast
corner of Lot 1, Block 1, Jones'
Subdivision, Block 54, Plat "C",
Salt Lake City Survey, said
point also being the Northwest
corner of 1100 West and First
South Streets; and running
thence South 0° 2' 53" East
132.17 feet; thence West 334.00
feet; thence North <f 00/ 55"
West 214.63 feet to the Northeast corner of Lot 1, Block 2,
said Jones' Subdivision; thence
North 33* 42' East 59.48 feet;
thence East 36.00 feet to the
Northwest corner of Lot 2,
Block 1, said Jones' Subdivision; thence South 132.00 feet;
thence East 264.00 feet to point
of beginning. Contains 51,433.32
square feet, or 1.190 acres.
Said vacation Is made expressly subject to all existing
rights of way and easements of
all public utilities of any and
every description now located
on, in, under or over the
confines of the above described
property, and also subiect to
the rights of entry thereon for
the purpose of maintaining,
altering, repairing, replacing,
removing or rerouting said
utilities and all of them.
SECTION 2. This ordinance
shall take effect 30 days after
Its first publication.
Passed by the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City,
Utah, this 5th day of October,
1977.
TED L. WILSON
Mayor
MILDRED V.HIGHAM
City Recorder
(SEAL)
BILL NO. 173 of 1977
Published October 15.1977

Motion to Intervene Case No. 78-7764

Exhibit III

JAN

m.sui\!.sh
3rDavid B. Boyce
of BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH
Attorneys for Interveners
500 American Savings Building
61 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone 531-8300
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * * * * * * *
SALT LAKE CITY,

MOTION

Plaintiff,
C i v i l No.

vs.

78-7764

MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY CO.,
Defendant.
* * *
LEMEL CORPORATION, MELVIN E.
INGERSOLL, MARIAN INGERSOLL,
his wife, LELAND R. INGERSOLL,
EVELYN E. INGERSOLL, his wife,
Applicants for Intervention.
* * * * * * * * * * * * *
Come now Lemel Corporation, Melvin E. Ingersoll,
Marian Ingersoll, his wife, Leland R. Ingersoll and Evelyn E.
Ingersoll, his wife, Applicants for Intervention, and move the
Court for leave to intervene as parties plaintiff in this
action in order to assert their interests in the claims set
forth in the complaint of the plaintiff, which is adopted by the
Applicants for Intervention for the present time as complaint
of Applicants for Intervention, reserving the right to any
action Applicants for Intervention may have against plaintiff.
This motion is made pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure and for the reasons that the representation of the Applicants' interest by existing parties may be
inadequate and the Applicants may be bound by a judgment in the

action and because the Applicants are so situated as to be
adversely affected by a disposition of the matter and because
the Applicants' claim and the main action have common questions
of law and fact.
Dated thio 5th day of January, 1979.
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH

UCUTJcL

CJU

David B. Boyce
Attorneys for Applicant^ for Intervention
500 American Savings Building
61 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 5th day of January, 1979,
a copy of the foregoing instrument was mailed, postage prepaid,
as follows:
James S. Lowrie
Thomas E K. Cerruti
JONES, WALDO, H0LBR00K & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Defendant
800 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

ZJ^^J,)6K.
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Motion to Dismiss Case No. 7 8-7764

Exhibit IV

James S. L o w r i e , E s q . , and
Thomas E . K. C e r r u t i , E s q . , o f
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUCH
Attorneys for Defendant
800 W a l k e r Bank B u i l d i n g
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah
84111
Telephone:
521-3200

**™*mm^/&&foliitf
PEHJTY CUM*

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
SALT LAKE CITY,

MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No.

C 78 7764

MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY CO.,
Defendant.
oooOooo
The Defendant, Mountain Fuel Supply Co., by and
through its counsel, moves the Court pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismiss this matter
on the grounds that the Complaint fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be aranted.
This Motion is based in part on two Salt Lake City
ordinances which were filed on December 28, 19 78, and therefore
may properly be treated pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure as a motion for summary judgment.
Defendant will seek, pursuant to its Motion to Shorten
Time for Hearing, to have this motion heard contemporaneously
with Plaintiffs Order to Show Cause Bearing \*hich is ir> the nature
of a preliminary injunction.
DATED this if£ day of January, 1979.
JONE^, WALDO, H O I ^ O O K ^ MCDONOUGH
B>

.
Tames S. Lowrie^
Thomas E. K, Cerruti
Attorneys for Defendant

Order Dismiss inteverners Case No. 7 8-7764

Exhibit V

James S. Lowrie, and
- -»
Thomas E. K. Cerruti, of
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Defendants
Mountain Fuel Supply Company and
Latin America Assembly of God, Inc.
800 Walker Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3200

* ? • » . c.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTIRCT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
SALT LAKE CITY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY CO.,
LEMEL CORPORATION, and
LATIN AMERICA ASSEMBLY
OF GOD, INC.,
Defendants.

O R D E R

LEMEL CORPORATION, MELVIN E.
INGERSOLL, MARIAN INGERSOLL,
his wife, LELAND R. INGERSOLL,
EVELYN E. INGERSOLL, his wife,
Civil No. C-78-7764

Interveners,
vs.
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY CO.,
and SALT LAKE CITY,
Defendants and
Cross-Defendants.
oooOooo

The motion for summary judgment of Defendants Mountain
Fuel Supply Company against Interveners, Lemel Corporation,
Melvin E. Ingersoll, Marian Ingersoll, his wife, Leland R.
Ingersoll and Evelyn E. Ingersoll, his wife, having come
on to be heard pursuant to notice and the Court having heard

-2-

representations of counsel for Mountain Fuel Supply Company
and no objections being lodged by the Plaintiff Salt Lake
City Corporation and no one appearing on behalf of the
Interveners and the Court having considered the matters on
file and being of the opinion that the motion for summary
judgment by Mountain Fuel should be granted,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Mountain Fuel Supply Company
is granted summary judgment against Interveners on their
amended complaint and said complaint shall be dismissed with
prejudice on the merit|_
DATED this

//Vyaay of

JL ^ v / S ^ ^ L ^

BY THE COURT:

1982

Judgment Case No. 78-7764

Exhibit VI

FILE"- •• 0 E r * " -piCr
S4LT • • • - llt-l'
,n:r,

FEB 2 II33 a r 8 3
James S. Lowrie, and
Thomas E. K. Cerruti, of
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Defendants
800 Walker Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3200

D

C - f ' t T V CLERK

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JUDGMENT

MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY CO.,
LEMEL CORPORATION and
LATIN AMERICA ASSEMBLY OF
GOD, INC.

Civil No. C78-7764

Defendants.

The trial of the above-captioned matter came on
before this Court on the 8th day of November, 1982, with
plaintiff, Salt Lake City, represented by Judy F. Lever, Esq.
and defendants, Mountain Fuel Supply Company and Latin America
Assembly of God, Inc. represented by James S. Lowrie, Esq. and
Thomas E. K. Cerruti, Esq.

The Court has heretofore entered

a Memorandum Decision and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law.

The Court now enters its
JUDGMENT
1.

Judgment is hereby entered in favor of the

defendants on the Complaint of plaintiff, Salt Lake City, and

-2-

plaintiff's claims are hereby dismissed no cause of action and
with prejudice on the merits.
2.

Salt Lake City Ordinances 172 and 173 of 1977 are

hereby declared to be valid and to have vested title to the
land described in each of said Ordinances in the abutting land
Owners.
DATED this ^ (

day of January, 1983.
BY THE COURT:

Tfavld B. Dee,
District Judge

A<L

Memorandum Opinion and Order

C-85-0790

Exhibit VII

RONALD C. BATJE33
AHy. At Law

DEC

41S86

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
INTERSTATE LAND CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation,
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
Plaintiff,
ORDER
vs.
R. D. PATTERSON

CIVIL NO. C 85-790

Defendant.
This

matter

came

before

the court

on the motions of

defendant R. D. Patterson and proposed Intervenors to correct
previous orders.
59(a)(6)

The motions are expressly premised on Rules

and (7), 59(d),

59(e),

60(b), U.R.C.P.,

"or other

applicable rules" and are directed at the following orders:
1.

Order Denying Motion to Intervene Filed by Melvin E.

Ingersoll, Marian Beverly Ingersoll, Leland R. Ingersoll,
and

Evelyn

E.

(hereinafter

Ingersoll,

referred

to

dated
as

September
the

"order

4, 1986
denying

intervention").
2.

Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment

against

Defendant,

dated

September

4, 1986 (hereinafter

referred to as "summary judgment order").
The motions in question are contained in a single pleading
dated September 13, 1986 and filed on September 15, 1986. It

INTERSTATE V. PATTERSON

PAGE TWO

OPINION AND ORDER

was plaintiff, however, that caused the motions to be heard by
the court on October 20, 1986, by its filing of a Notice of
Hearing.
The court heard the arguments of counsel on October 20,
1986, at 2:00 o,clock p.m., and took the matter under advisement.
Thereafter,

the

court

reviewed

the

entire

file,

including

specifically the plaintiff's original Motion for Summary Judgment
and

supporting

papers, the original Motion

Proposed Complaint

to Intervene and

in Intervention and the transcript of the

hearing of May 5, 1986 on the plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment

and

proposed

Interveners'

Motion

to

Intervene

(hereinafter sometimes referred to as "the original motions").
The following procedural facts are significant:
1.

The original motions were fully presented to the court

and argued on May 5,

1986.

No legal memoranda, brief or

evidence were submitted by the defendant or the proposed
Interveners.

At that hearing, counsel for the proposed

Intervenors proposed to submit a post hearing memorandum
(Tr. p. 13) but none was forthcoming.
2.

The court, per Judge Fishier, took the matter under

advisement and thereafter issued his ruling by means of a
minute entry dated July 28, 1986.
3.

Proposed written orders incorporating the court's ruling

were mailed by plaintiff to opposing counsel on August 1,
1986.

Defendant and proposed Intervenors did not object to
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the form or substance of these proposed orders. Thereafter,
on September 4, 1986, the order denying intervention and the
summary judgment order were entered by the court per Judge
Daniels,

Judge

Fishier

having

previously

resigned

his

position on the court.
4.

The tenth day following entry of the summary judgment

order fell on a weekend and defendant filed the motions
challenging

the summary

judgment

order on September 15,

1986, the next succeeding day which was not a weekend or
legal holiday.

Consequently, if such motions were proper

under Rule 59, U.R.C.P., they were timely filed under Rule
59(b).
The

primary

issue presented

question are truly Rule 59 motions.

is whether

the motions in

The resolution of this issue

impacts not only the consideration of the motions by this court
but, more significantly, the finality of the judgment in question
and thus the timeliness of any appeal to the Supreme Court of
Utah.

For the reasons set forth below, this court deems the

motions as not properly filed under Rule 59.
The motions

in question

59(a)(6) and (7) and 59(d).
reference

a

"new

are premised

in part

on Rule

Each of these subdivisions expressly

trial"

as

the

contemplated

relief.

Consequently, they are applicable only when a trial has preceded
the motion.

In summary judgment proceedings no trial takes place

and, in accordance with Rule 52(a), findings and conclusions are
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Thus, a challenge to the entry of the summary

judgment order cannot be premised on subdivisions (a) or (d) of
Rule 59. Additionally, Rule 52(b) is inapplicable to the summary
judgment proceedings.
The remaining question under Rule 59 is whether subdivision
(e) is a proper vehicle to challenge the rendering of a summary
judgment.

Depending

question,

a

further

on

the

issue

resolution

may

be

of

this

remaining

whether

Rule

59(e)

is

appropriate to challenge a summary judgment when no new evidence,
fact or even legal argument is presented in support of the Rule
59(e) motion.
Rule 59(e), which is identical to Rule 59(e) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, has been a part of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure from their inception.

Rule 59(e) was, however,

an addition to the federal rules in the 1946 amendments.
Advisory

Committee

The

Notes to the federal rules indicate that

subdivision (e) was w... added to care for a situation such as
that arising in Boaz v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York. ... 146
F.2d 321 [(8th Cir. 1944)] and makes clear that the district
court possesses the power asserted in that case to alter or amend
a judgment after its entry.11

In Boaz the court held that the

district

power

court

had

inherent

to

amend

dismissal without prejudice to a judgment
prejudice.

a

judgment

of

of dismissal with

While such power of amendment inheres in the court

rendering the judgment, the use of Rule 59(e) for amendment of
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judgment is applicable in very limited situations such as those
presented in Boaz.

The Advisory Committee Notes themselves thus

suggest

59(e) was not

that Rule

intended

for the wholesale

challenge of judgments when the other provisions of Rule 59 do
not apply.
In the instant case, the Rule 59(e) motion does pose a
wholesale attack on the summary judgment order.

While cast as a

Rule 59 motion, it is in fact a motion to reconsider.

There are

various specific rules which allow a party to seek reconsideration following a trial. Rules 50(b), 52(b) and Rule 59, U.R.C.P.
The logical place for a similar rule upon which to premise a
reconsideration of a summary judgment would be in a subdivision
of Rule 56. No such rule, however, exists.
Provision of an express and specific mechanism to reconsider
a final judgment, such as those prescribed in Rules 50(b), 52((b)
and 59, is necessary so that a motion for reconsideration can
stay the running of the time for filing a notice of appeal.
allow

Rule

59(e)

to

be

used

as

a

catchall

means

To

to seek

reconsideration of any final judgment merely provides a means to
challenge the integrity and finality of this court1s judgments
and allows the moving party further time within which to file an
appeal.
There

are

numerous

thresholds

in

summary

judgment

proceedings in which a party opposing the motion may be heard.
Quite obviously, the party may submit opposing papers, memoranda
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and briefs and be heard at oral argument.

Following any hearing

and while the court has the matter under advisement, the party
opposing the motion may make further submissions.

Even if the

matter is not taken under advisement, a signed judgment is always
necessary under Rule 58A.

Rule 2.9 of the District Court Rules

of Practice requires service of a proposed judgment on opposing
counsel and allows five days for objection.
final judgment be entered.

Only then can the

Thus, Rule 2o9 provides the opposing

party with an opportunity by means of objection to convince the
court that its previously ruling was erroneous.

No further

mechanism for reconsideration is necessary or desirable.
The instant case is illustrative.

The plaintiff originally

presented this matter to the court on May 5, 1986, in a hearing
on its Motion for Summary Judgment.
opportunity

to

file

papers,

opposition.

No such items were filed.

Defense counsel had the

memoranda,

and

affidavits

in

Counsel for the proposed

Interveners filed a Motion to Intervene and a Proposed Complaint
in Intervention.

At the hearing on plaintiff's Motion

for

Summary Judgment, defense counsel and counsel for the proposed
Intervenors were heard.
The court thereafter had the matter under advisement for
over two months during which time defendants and the proposed
Intervenors made no filings or submissions.
the proposed

While counsel for

Intervenors did propose to file a post hearing

memorandum (Tr. p. 13), none was forthcoming.

It is particularly
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at no time have defendant

or the proposed

Intervenors submitted affidavits or the like raising a genuine
issue of material fact.

Following the minute entry of July 28,

1986, which was mailed to all counsel, neither defendant nor the
proposed
ruling.

Intervenors
Moreover,

no

requested

this

objections

court

to

the

to reconsider
proposed

its

judgment

submitted by plaintiff1s counsel were interposed under Rule 2.9
of the District Court Rules of Practice.
Defendant and the proposed Intervenors now, however, seek to
have this court reconsider its final judgment by means of its
Rule 59 motions.

At the hearing of October 20, 1986, counsel for

defendant and intervenors admitted on the record that there was
nothing before the court, including new legal arguments, that had
not previously been submitted and argued at the May 5 hearing on
the original motions.

The only thing different was that there

was a new judge, Judge Fishier having resigned before the formal
entry of the written judgment.
The courts which have addressed the issue are split, some
holding that Rule 59(e) is not a proper vehicle to challenge a
summary judgment and others holding to the contrary.
compare Blair v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.

E.g.,

344 F Supp. 367 (S.D.

Fla. 1972) and Durkin v. Tavlor, 444 F. Supp. 879, 889-90 (E. D.
Va. 1977) with Sidnev-Vinstein v. A. H. Robins Co., 697 F. 2d
880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983) and Stephenson v. Calpine Conifers II.
Ltd., 652 F. 2d 808 (9th Cir. 1981).

See also Jetero Constr. Co.

INTERSTATE V. PATTERSON

PAGE EIGHT

OPINION AND ORDER

v. South Memphis Lumber Co., 531 F. 2d 1348, 1351-52 (6th Cir.
1976).
Hume v. Small Claims Court of Murray City, 590 P. 2d 309,
310-311 (Utah 1979) addresses the issue from the standpoint of a
denial of a petition for a writ of mandamus.

To that extent it

is instructive but not controlling in the context of a summary
judgment.

In the latter context many more opportunities are

generally

available

for

parties

and

advocates

to

present

argument.

Parties opposing summary judgment are also generally

presented an opportunity by means of objections under Rule 2.9 to
convince the court prior to entry of judgment that its ruling was
erroneous.
Even if Rule 59(e) was generally deemed a proper mechanism
to challenge a summary judgment, it should not be deemed a proper
use of such mechanism when no new fact, piece of evidence or even
legal argument is presented in support of a Rule 59(e) motion or
when a party opposing summary judgment fails to object to a
proposed judgment under Rule 2.9.

Under such circumstances, the

party opposing summary judgment should pursue their remedy by
appeal rather than a motion for reconsideration under the guise
of Rule 59(e).
For the reasons set forth above, defendant's Rule 59 motions
are denied as being improperly premised on Rule 59.

Proposed

Intervenors' motion for reconsideration cannot even be deemed to
be premised

on Rule 59 since they were not parties to the
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In the event this

matter is appealed and this courtfs view of Rule 59 is correct,
plaintiff might be able to avoid some of the additional delay by
moving for summary disposition under Rule 10, U.R.A.P. on the
grounds that the notice of appeal was filed more than thirty days
following judgment.
Because the Utah Supreme Court could disagree with the views
expressed herein and to avoid any possible remand solely for this
court to reconsider its judgment pursuant to the defendant's Rule
59 motions, the court has considered the entire record and finds
no manifest error underlying the orders entered on September 4,
1986.

The court particularly notes that it has not yet been

presented with any matter by defendant or otherwise which tends
to raise a genuine issue of material fact.

For these reasons,

even if defendant's motions should be deemed properly presented
under Rule 59, the motions are denied.
The court further denies defendant's motion under Rule 60(b)
for the reason that it is a motion to reconsider and is not
properly premised on the grounds specified in Rule 60(b).

See

Blair v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 367 (S.D. Fla,
1972) .

The only surprise that has been asserted was expressly

asserted at the May 5, 1986 hearing, over four months preceding
the filing of these motions, and no further memorandum was filed
after the May 5 hearing as promised.
It

is

therefore

ordered,

adjudged

and

decreed

that
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defendant's and proposed Intervenors1 motions under Rule 59(a)(6)
and

(7), 59(d),

59(e),

60(b), U.R.C.P., "or other applicable

rules" are hereby denied.

DATED THIS 2nd day of December, 1986.

it
MICHAEL R. MURPHY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Memorandum Opinion and Order, postage prepaid, to
Ronald C. Barker, Esq.
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
84115-3692
Patrick O'Hara, Esq.
P.O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah
84145
Ralph J. Hafen, Esq.
402 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
This p(c—£-

84101

day of December, 1986.
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Notice of Automatic Stay Case No. 78-7764
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David E. Leta
ROE AND FOWLER
Attorneys for LeMel Corporation
340 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-9841
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal
corporation of the State of Utah,
NOTICE OF
AUTOMATIC STAY

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 78-7764

MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY CO., et al.,
Defendants.
LEMEL CORPORATION, MELVIN E.
1NGERSOLL, MARIAN INGERSOLL,
his wife, LELAND R. INGERSOLL,
and EVELYN E. INGERSOLL, his wife,
Interveners.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on January 5, 1981, LeMel Corporation
filed

a petition

Bankruptcy

for

Code,

relief

under Chapter 11 of the United

Bankruptcy

No. 80-00755,

in

the

United

States
States

Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah, Central Division.

The filing of the petition by the debtor operates as a stay of all
judicial

and

quasi-judicial

proceedings

property as provided in 11 U.S.C. § 362.

against

the

debtor

and its

Furthermore, all actions taken after the date of the filing of the
petition in violation of the stay are void and without affect.

DATED this

I*)

day of July, 1981.

Da via E\Leta v
ROE AND FOWLER
340 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for LeMel Corporation
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the l7jCfL> day of July, 1981, I served
the foregoing Notice of Automatic Stay upon Judy F. Lever, attorney
for Salt Lake City, by depositing a copy thereof in the United States
mails, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Judy F. Lever, Esq.
Assistant City Attorney
100 City and County Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM
B. STATUTE TEXTS

Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2
Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-13
Rule 24 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (All portions)
Rule 59 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (All portions)
Rule 59f Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (All portions)
District Court Local Rule 2.9(b)
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three years. The current judicial council shall continue in existence with full authority until the election
of the members of the council as provided in this
section.
(2) The appellate court nominating commission
established by Subsection 20-1-7.2(1) may not be
convened initially prior to July 1, 1986 nor later
than September 1,1986.
(3) The provisions in this act for court jurisdictions may not be implemented until January 1, 1987.
Courts then continue to have jurisdiction to dispose
of any cases pending on that date.
(4Xa) Any justice or judge of a court of record,
whose election to office was effective on or before
July 1, 1985, shall hold the office for the remainder
of the term to which he was elected. The justice or
judge is subject to an unopposed retention election
as provided by law at the general election immediately preceding the expiration of the respective term
of office.
(b) Any justice or judge of a court of record
whose appointment to office was effective on or
before July 1, 1985, is subject to an unopposed
retention election as provided by law at the first
general election held more than three years after the
date of the appointment.
(c) Any justice or judge of a court of record
whose appointment to office was effective after July
1, 1985, is subject to an unopposed retention election as provided by law at the first general election
held more than three years after the date of the
appointment.
i*Js

Chapter 2. Supreme Court
78-2-1. Number of Justices * Term - Retirement Chief justice tail associate chief justice - Selection aad
functions.
78-2-1.5. Repealed.
78-2-1.6. Repealed.
78-2-2. (Effective through December 31, 1987). Supreme
Court Jurisdiction.
Tt-2-2. (Effective January 1, 1988). Supreme Court
jurisdiction.
78-2-3. Repealed.
78-2-4. Supreme Court - Rulemaking, Judges pro
tempore, and practice of law.
78-2-5. Court always open for transaction of business.
78-2-6. Appellate court administrator.
78-2-7 through 78-2-10. Repealed.
78-2-11. Reporter • Deputy clerks - Assistants.
78-2-12. Postage aad office supplies.
78-2-13. Bailiff* and assistant librarian.
78-2-14. Sheriffs to attend and serve.

78-2-1. Number of justices - Term Retirement • Chief justice and associate chief
justice - Selection and functions.
(1) The Supreme Court consists of five justices.
(2) A justice of the Supreme Court shall be appointed initially to serve until the first general election held more than three years after the effective
date of the appointment. Thereafter, the term of
office of a justice of the Supreme Court is ten years
and until his successor is appointed and approved in
accordance with Section 20-1 -7.1.
(3) The justices of the Supreme Court shall elect a
chief justice from among the members of the court
by a majority vote of all justices. The term of the
office of chief justice is four years. The chief justice
may not serve successive terms. The chief justice
may resign from the office of chief justice without
resigning from the Supreme Court. The chief justice
CODE* Co

78-2-2.

may be removed from the office of chief justice by
a majority vote of all justices of the Supreme Court.
(4) If the justices are unable to elect a chief justice
within 30 days of a vacancy in that office, the associate chief justice shall act as chief justice until a
chief justice is elected under this section. If the
associate chief justice is unable or unwilling to act
as chief justice, the most senior justice shall act as
chief justice until a chief justice is elected under this
section.
(5) In addition to the chief justice's duties as a
member of the Supreme Court, the chief justice has
additional duties as provided by law.
(6) There is created the office of associate chief
justice. The term of office of the associate chief
justice is two years. The associate chief justice may
serve in that office no more than two successive
terms. The associate chief justice shall be elected by
a majority vote of the members of the Supreme
Court and shall be allocated duties as the chief
justice decides. If the chief justice is absent or otherwise unable to serve, the associate chief justice
shall serve as chief justice. The chief justice, where
not inconsistent with law, may delegate responsibilities to the associate chief justice.
lfns
78-2-1.5. Repealed.
trzi
7S-2-1.6. Repealed.
mi
78-2-2. (Effective through December 31, 1987).
Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to
answer questions of state law certified by a court of
the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to
issue all extraordinary writs and authority to issue
all writs and process necessary to carry into effect
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its
jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the
Court of Appeals prior to final judgment by the
Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in cases originating
in:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the Board of State Lands;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; and
(v) the state engineer;
( 0 a final judgment or decree of any court of
record holding a statute of the United States or this
state unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(g) interlocutory appeals from any court of
record involving a charge of a first degree or capital
felony;
(h) appeals from the district court involving a
conviction of a first degree or capital felony; and
(i) orders, judgments, and decrees of an> court
of record over which the Court of Appeals does not
have original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court
of Appeals any of the matters over which the
Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,
except for the following matters:
(a) first degree and capital felony convictions;

78-2-2.

Judicial Code

(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) general water adjudication;
(!) taxation and revenue; and
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3Xa)
through (h).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in
granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari
for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication,
but the Supreme Court shall review those cases
certified to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3Kb).
IN*
78-2-2. (Effective January 1, 1988). Supreme
Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to
answer questions of state law certified by a court of
the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to
issue all extraordinary writs and authority to issue
all writs and process necessary to carry into effect
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its
jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the
Court of Appeals prior to final judgment by the
Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in cases originating
in:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(Hi) the Board of State Lands;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; and
(v) the state engineer;
( 0 a final judgment or decree of any court of
record holding a statute of the United States or this
state unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(g) interlocutory appeals from any court of
record involving a charge of a first degree or capital
felony;
(h) appeals from the district court involving a
conviction of a first degree or capital felony; and
(i) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court
of record over which the Court of Appeals does not
have original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court
of Appeals any of the matters over which the
Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,
except for the following matters:
(a) first degree and capital felony convictions;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) general water adjudication;
( 0 taxation and revenue; and
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3Ma)
through (h).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in
granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari
for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication,
but the Supreme Court shall review those cases
certified to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3Kb).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the
requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, in its review
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of agency adjudicative proceedings.
wtr
78-2-3. Repealed.
vm
78-2-4. Supreme Court - Rulemaking, judges
pro tempore, and practice of law.
i
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of pro-"
cedure and evidence for use in the courts of the;
state and shall by rule manage the appellate process.'
The Legislature may amend the rules of procedure^
and evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon *£
vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses
of the Legislature.
?
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah,
Constitution, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize retired justices and judges and judges pro^
tempore to perform any judicial duties. Judges pro
tempore shall be citizens of the United States, Utah ;
residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah.
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the
practice of law, including admission to practice law
and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted
to the practice of law.
its*
78-2-5c Court always open for transaction of
business.
The Supreme Court shall always be open for the
transaction of business. Adjournments from day to
day, or from time to time, are to be construed as
recesses in the sessions, and shall not prevent the
court from sitting at any time.
lfSJ
78-2-6. Appellate court administrator.
The appellate court administrator shall appoint
clerks and support staff as necessary for the operation of the Supreme Court and the Court of >
Appeals. The duties of the clerks and support staff ,<
shall be established by the appellate court adminis-1
trator, and powers established by rule of the ;
Supreme Court.
i*«*
78-2-7 through 78-2-10. Repealed.
its* .
78-2-11. Reporter • Deputy clerks - Assistants.
The Supreme Court shall appoint a reporter of its \
decisions who shall hold office during the pleasure
of the court, and may appoint, remove at pleasure, '
and fix the compensation for such deputy clerks and :
other assistants as may be necessary for the transa- •
ction of the business of the court.
im
78-2-12. Postage and office supplies.
Stationery, postage and supplies necessary for the
transaction of the business of the Supreme Court,
including the printing of the court docket, shall be
furnished by the purchasing department or officer
of the state, on requisition therefor made through
the clerk.
its*
78-2-13. Bailiffs and assistant librarian.
The court is hereby authorized to appoint and
remove at pleasure the necessary bailiffs to attend
the court, and to perform such other duties and
execute such orders as may be directed or made by
the court. The court may also appoint and remove
at pleasure an assistant librarian, who shall perform
such duties as the court may order or direct.
itw
78-2-14, Sheriffs to attend and serve.
The court may at any time require the attendance
and services of any sheriff in the state.
1*53

Chapter 2a. Court of Appeals
78-2a-l. Covrt of Aooeefa.

78»2a-2. Hwmbtr of Jodfts - Fmctiom - Ftttag fees.
7*.2»-3. (Effective t a m a * December 31,1987). Coort
of Anne** jortodktton.
78-2a-3. (Effective Mummy 1, ttJ8>. Cowl of Appeals
Cox •Co
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tounting to the sum of SS per acre.
1953
•12-12. Possession must be continuous, and
taxes paid.
In no case shall adverse possession be considered
ablishcd under the provisions of any section of
is code, unless it shall be shown that the land has
en occupied and claimed for the period of seven
ars continuously, and that the party, his predece>rs and grantors have paid all taxes which have
en levied and assessed upon such land according
law.

1953

-12-12.1. Possession and payment of taxes Proviso • Tax title.
In no case shall adverse possession be established
ider the provisions of this code, unless it shall be
own that the land has been occupied and claimed
r the period of seven years continuously, and that
e party, his predecessors and grantors have paid
the taxes which have been levied and assessed
>on such land according to law. Provided,
iwever, that payment by the holder of a tax title to
il property or his predecessors, of all the taxes
/ied and assessed upon such real property after the
linquent tax sale or transfer under which he
lims for a period of not less than four years and
r not less than one year after the effective date of
is amendment, shall be sufficient to satisfy the
quirements of this section in regard to the
lyment of taxes necessary to establish adverse
^session.

I*SJ

-12-13. Adverse possession of public streets or
ways.
No person shall be allowed to acquire any right or
le in or to any lands held by any town, city or
unty, or the corporate authorities thereof, designed for public use as streets, lanes, avenues,
leys, parks or public squares, or for any other
iblic purpose, by adverse possession thereof for
ty length of time whatsoever, unless it shall affiratively appear that such town or city or county or
e corporate authorities thereof have sold, or othwise disposed of, and conveyed such real estate to
purchaser for a valuable consideration, and that
r more than seven years subsequent to such conyance the purchaser, his grantees or successors in
terest, have been in the exclusive, continuous and
Iverse possession of such real estate; in which case
t adverse title may be acquired.
i§»
t-12-14. Possession of tenant deemed possession
of landlord.
When the relation of landlord and tenant has
istcd between any persons, the possession of the
nant is deemed the possession of the landlord until
e expiration of seven years from the termination
7
the tenancy, or, where there has been no written
ase, until the expiration of seven years from the
me of the last payment of rent, notwithstanding
at such tenant may have acquired another title, or
ay have claimed to hold adversely to his landlord;
it such presumption cannot be made after the
:riods herein limited.
1*53
1-12-15. Possession not affected by descent cast.
The right of a person to the possession of real
roperty is not impaired or affected by a descent
1st in consequence of the death of a person in
Dssession of such property.
1H3
1-12-16. Action to redeem mortgage of real
property.

No action to redeem a mortgage [of] real propty, with or without an account of rents and

90
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profits, may be brought by the mortgagor, or those
claiming under him, against the mortgagee in possession, or those claiming under him, unless he or
they have continuously maintained [an] adverse
possession of the mortgaged premises for seven
years after breach of some condition o f the mortgage.
193)
78-12-17. When more than one mortgagor.
If there is more than one such mortgagor, or'
more than one person claiming under a mortgagor,
some of whom are not entitled to maintain such an
action, under the provisions of this article, any one
of them who is entitled to maintain such an action
may redeem therein a divided or undivided part of
the mortgaged premises as his interest may appear,
and have an accounting for a part of the rents and
profits, proportionate to his interest in the mortgaged premises, on payment of a part of the mortgage money, bearing the same proportion to the
whole of such money as the value of his divided or
undivided interest in the premises bears to the whole
of such premises.
ms
78-12-18. Actions to recover estate sold by
guardian.

No action for the recovery of any estate sold by a
guardian can be maintained by the ward, or by any
person claiming under him, unless it is commenced
within three years next after the termination of the
guardianship.
IM*
78-12-19. Actions to recover estate sold by
-A
executor or administrator.

1

No action for the recovery of any estate sold by.
an executor or administrator in the course of any*
probate proceeding can be maintained by any heir
or other person claiming under the decedent, unless
it is commenced within three years next after such
sale. An action to set aside the sale may be instituted and maintained at any time within three years
from the discovery of the fraud or other lawful
grounds upon which the action is based.
itS3
78-12-20. Minority or disability prevents running
of period.
••
The two preceding sections [78-12-18, 78-12191 shall not apply to minors or others under any
legal disability to sue at the time when the right of
action first accrues but all such persons may commence an action within the time prescribed in the
next succeeding section [78-12-21].
it*3
78-12-21. Disabilities enumerated - Time of not
reckoned.

If a person entitled to commence an action for the
recovery of real property or for the recovery of the
possession of it, or to make any entry or defense,
founded on the title to real property or to rents or
services out of the property, is at the time the title
first descends or accrues, either under the age of
majority or mentally incompetent, the time during
which the disability continues is not a part of the
time in this article limited for the commencement of
the actions or the making of the entry or defense.
Article 2. Other Than Real Property
78-12-22. Within eight years.
78-12-23. Within six yean - Mesne profits of real
property • Instrument in writing • Distribution of
criminal proceeds to victim.
78-12-24. Public officers • Within six yean.
78-12-25. Within four years.
78-12-23.5. Injury due to defective design or construction
of improvement to real property • Within seven years.
78-12-26. Within three years.
78-12-27. Action against corporate stockholders or

For Annotations, consult C n n r a r n , i Annotatlnn s#rvi>»
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sons for his failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort. The
derivative action may not be maintained if it appears that the plaintiff does
not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders or members similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation or association.
The action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the
court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to
shareholders or members in such manner as the court directs.
Compiler's Notes. to Rule 23.1, F R C P .
Cross-References.
holders or directors,
against, $ 78-12-27
Corporation defined,
Sec. 4; § 16-10-2.

This rule is identical
— Corporate
limitation of

stockaction

Utah Const.. Art. XII,

Extraordinary writs, § 78-35-6 et seq.; Rule
65B.
Liability of corporate directors, § 16-10-44.
Liquidation of corporation, action by or
against receiver, § 16-10-93.
Sue and be sued, power of corporation to.
Utah Const., Art. XII. Sec. 4; § 16-10-4(b>.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Action barred.
—Plaintiffs not shareholders at time of wrongful act.
Class action distinguished.
Action barred.
—Plaintiffs not shareholders at time of
wrongful act.
Shareholders' action against former corporate directors and officers for alleged conversion of corporate assets and for breach of fiduciary duties was barred by this rule where the
shareholders did not acquire their stock until
after the events complained of and the shares
did not devolve on them by operation of law.

Noland v. Barton, 741 F.2d 315 (10th Cir.
1984).
Class action distinguished.
Action by corporate shareholders which alleged injury to the corporation only, and not to
them a* individuals, was a derivative action
and could not be brought as a class action.
Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d
636 (Utah 1980>.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 19 Am. J u r 2d Corporations
§ 2250; 59 Am J u r 2d Parties * 77
C.J.S. — 18 C.J.S. Corporations ^ 564 to
566.
A.LoR. — Communications by corporation as
privileged in stockholders' action, 34 A.L.R.3d
1106.
Punitive damages, allowance of in stockholder's derivative action, 67 A.L.R.3d 350.
Application to derivative actions for breach

of fiduciary duty, under § 36(b) of Investment
Company Act of 1940 (15 USCS § 80a-35'b",
of requirement, stated in Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that complaint m
derivative actions allege what efforts were
made by shareholders to obtain desired action
or reasons for failure to do so, 65 A.L.R. Fed.
542.
Key Numbers. — Corporations «= 206. 207.

Rule 24. Intervention,
(a) Intervention of right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: < 1) when a statute confers an unconditional right
to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated
that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede
71
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lis ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
(b) Permissive intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be pernitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers a conditional right
x> intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action
lave a question of law or fact in common. When a party to an action relies for
fround of claim or defense upon any statute or executive order administered
>y a governmental officer or agency or upon any regulation, order, requirenent, or agreement issued or made pursuant to the statute or executive order,
he officer or agency upon timely application may be permitted to intervene in
he action. In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the
ntervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of
he original parties.
(c) Procedure. A person desiring to intervene shall serve a motion to interene upon the parties as provided in Rule 5. The motions shall state the
Tounds therefor and shall be accompanied by a pleading setting forth the
laim or defense for which intervention is sought.
Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amendtent combined former Subdivisions (a)(2) and
i)(3) into present Subdivision (a)(2) and reTote the contents thereof.
CompUer^s Notes. - This rule is similar to
Cross-References.- Claims for relief and
Senses, Rule 8.
Fee for filing complaint in intervention,
21-2-2.

Form for motion to intervene as defendant,
Form 24.
Misjoinder and nonjoinder of parties, Rule
21
N e c e s s a r y j o i n d e r of p a r t i e s , R u l e 19.
*aTtie* P l a i n t i f T a n d d e f e n d a n t ' capacity,
Ru,e

17

Permissive joinder of parties, Rule 20.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

ppeal.
•Order denying intervention.
itervention of right.
•Adverse effect.
—Court's disposition of property.
Insurer.
—Uninsured motorist coverage.
irisdiction.
Error by court clerk.
>stjudgment intervention.
Not Allowed.
Showing required.
meliness.
Individual facts.
ppeal.

Intervention of right.

Order denying intervention.
Order which denies with prejudice an applition for intervention is appealable. Tracy v.
liversity of Utah Hosp., 619 P.2d 340 (Utah
80).

—Adverse effect.
Court's disposition of property.
when the application for intervention is
m a d e timely, this rule permits intervention as
a matter of right when the applicant will be
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(e) Filing transcript of satisfaction in other counties. When any satisfaction of a judgment shall have been entered on the judgment docket of the
county where such judgment was first docketed, a certified transcript of satisfaction, or a certificate by the clerk showing such satisfaction, may be filed
with the clerk of the district court in any other county where the judgment
may have been docketed. Thereupon a similar entry in the judgment docket
shall be made by the clerk of such court; and such entry shall have the same
effect as in the county where the same was originally entered.
Compiler's Notes. — There is no federal
rule covering this subject matter

Cross-References. — Fee not charged foi
filing satisfaction, & 21-2-2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Court.
—Duty.
Attachment.
Effect.
—Acceptance of full payment.
Owner or attorney
—Vacation of satisfaction.
Hearing.
by the judgment Sierra Nevada Mill Co. v.
Keith O'Brien Co , 48 U. 12, 156 P. 943.

Court.
—Duty.
Attachment.
Court had duty to make order directing partial satisfaction of judgment to extent of money
collected through attachment proceeding
Blake v. Farrell, 31 U 110, 86 P 805
Effect.
—Acceptance of full payment.
When plaintiff voluntarily accepted full payment of a judgment in his favor, the satisfaction and discharge operated to satisfy and discharge everything merged in and adjudicated

Owner or attorney.
—Vacation of satisfaction.
Hearing.
The recorded satisfaction of judgment signed
by judgment creditor cannot be vacated without action and hearing in equity, and the lien
of an attorney against the proceeds of the judgment does not include his personal right to execute against the judgment debtor Utah C V.
Federal Credit Union v. Jenkins, 528 P 2d
1187

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments
§ 979 et seq.
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S Judgments ^ 574 to 584
A.L.R. — Voluntary payment into court of

judgment against one joint tort-feasor as release of others. 40 A.L.R.3d 1181.
Key Numbers. — Judgment *» 891 to 899.

Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment.
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
judgment:
180
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(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party,
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given
under the influence of passion or prejudice
<6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision,
or that it is against law
<7) Error in law
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be
served with the motion The opposing party has 10 days after such service
within which to serve opposing affidavits The time within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by
the parties by written stipulation The court may permit reply affidavits
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall
specify the grounds therefor
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.
Compiler's Notes*. — This rule is similar to
Rule 59, F R C P
Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion
for ne* trial * 21-2 2
Harm?e-*fe error not ground for ne* trial,
Rule 61

Juror's competency as witness as to vahdit>
of verdict or indictment Rules of Evidence,
R u i e go6

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Abandonment of motion
Accident or surprise
Arbitratron awards
Caption on motion for new trial
Correction of insufficient or informal verdict
Correction of record
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JUDGMENT
Cir.l9f>M), cert, denied, 35K l . S . 932, 79 S.Ct. 320, 3
L.Ed.2d 304 (1959); Beacon Fed. S. <& L. Assn. r. Federal
Home L. Bunk Bd., 260 F.2d 240 (Tth Cir.), cert, denied.
301 U.S. 823, 80 S.Ct. TO, 4 L.Ed.2d 07 (1959); Ram v.
Paramount
Film D. Corp., 278 F.2d 191 (4th Cir.1900).
The amended rule eliminates these uncertainties by
requiring that there he a judgment set out on a separate
document—distinct from any opinion or memorandum—
which provides the basis for the entry of judgment. That
judgments shall be on separate documents is also indicated in Rule 79(b); and see General Rule 10 of the L. S.
District Courts for the Eastern and Southern Districts of
New York; Rum v. Paramount Film I). Corp., supra, at
194.
See the amendment of Rule 79(a) and the new specimen
forms of judgment. Forms 31 and 32.
See also Rule T>f>(b)(l) and (2> covering the subject of
judgments by default.
Rule

59.

New T r i a l s ;
ments

Amendment

of

Judg-

( a ) G r o u n d s . A new trial m a y he g r a n t e d to all
or any of t h e p a r t i e s a n d on all or p a r t of t h e issues
<1) in an action in which t h e r e has been a trial by
j u r y , for any of t h e r e a s o n s for which new trials
have h e r e t o f o r e been g r a n t e d in actions at law in
t h e c o u r t s of t h e l ' n i t e d S t a t e s ; and (2) in an action
triod without a j u r y , for any of t h e r e a s o n s fur
which r e h e a r i n g s have h e r e t o f o r e been g r a n t e d in
s u i t s in equity in t h e c o u r t s of t h e l ' n i t e d S u i t e s .
On a motion for a new trial in an action tried
w i t h o u t a j u r y , t h e c o u r t may open t h e j u d g m e n t if
one h a s been e n t e r e d , t a k e additional t e s t i m o n y ,
a m e n d findings of fact and conclusions of law or
m a k e new findings and conclusions, a n d direct the
e n t r y of a new j u d g m e n t .
(b) T i m e for M o t i o n . A motion for a new trial
shall be s e r v e d not l a t e r t h a n 10 d a y s a f t e r the
e n t r y of the j u d g m e n t .
(e) T i m e for S e r v i n g Affidavits. W h e n a mo.
tion for new trial is based upon affidavits they
shall be s e r v e d with t h e motion. T h e opposing
p a r t y h a s 10 d a y s a f t e r s u c h service within which
to s e r v e o p p o s i n g affidavits, which period may be
e x t e n d e d for an additional period not e x c e e d i n g 20
d a y s e i t h e r by t h e c o u r t for good c a u s e s h o w n or
by t h e p a r t i e s by w r i t t e n stipulation. Tin 1 court
m a y permit reply affidavits.
( d ) O n I n i t i a t i v e of Court. Not l a t e r t h a n 10
d a y s a f t e r e n t r y of j u d g m e n t t h e c o u r t of its own
initiative may o r d e r a new trial for any r e a s o n for
which it m i g h t h a v e g r a n t e d a new trial on motion
of a p a r t y . A f t e r giving t h e p a r t i e s notice and an
o p p o r t u n i t y to be h e a r d on t h e m a t t e r , t h e court
m a y g r a n t a motion for a new trial, timely served,
for a r e a s o n not s u i t e d in t h e motion. In e i t h e r
Complete Annotation MJ
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case, the court shall specify in the order the
grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment. A
motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be
served not later than 10 days after entry of the
judgment.
(As amended Dec. 27. 1!M«. eff. Mar. 19. 194S; Feb. 28,
19M. eff. July 1. 19d(i.)
NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON R I L E S
This rule represents an amalgamation of the petition
for rehearing of former Equity Rule (">9 (Petition for
Rehearing) and the motion for new trial of 28 U.S.C..
§2111. formerly § M l (New trials; harmless error), made
in the light of the experience and provision of the code
States. Compare Calif.Code Civ.Proc. Peering. 1937,
§§ f,:>r>-tio:{a. 2* l . S . C . § 2111. formerly § M l (New trials:
harmless error) is thus substantially continued in this
rule. C.S.C.. Title 2*. former $ s4<» (Executions; stay on
conditions) is modified in so far a.- it rontains time provisions inconsistent with Subdivision ib» For the effect of
the motion for new trial upon the time for taking an
appeal see }forse r. l'nited States. 192<i. 4tJ S.Ct. 241. 270
U.S. 1">1, 70 L.Ed. ")1S; Aspen Mininq and Smelting Co.
v. Billings, 1*9:',. 14 S.Ct. 4. i:><> t'.S. 31. 37 L.Ed.' 9SG.
For partial new trials which are permissible under
Subdivision (a), see (tasoline Products Co.. Inc. c.
Champlin Refining Co.. 1931. a I S.Ct. ">13. 2S3 L.S. 494.
7f> L.Ed. \W\
Schurrhol:
r. Rnarh. C.C.A.4, 1932. .>
F.2d 32; Simmons r. Fish, 1912. 97 N.E. 102. 21<> Mass.
fiGM. Ann.Ca>. 19121). ">ss (sustaining and recommending
the practice and citing federal cases and cases in accord
from about sixteen states and contra from three States).
The procedure in several States provides specifically for
partial new trials. Ariz.Rev.Code Ann.. Struckmeyer,
192S. § 3K">2; Calif.Code Civ.Proc. Peering. 1937. $$ i».r>7.
W>2; Smith-Hurd Ul.Stats., 1937, c. 11<». * 21»i (Par. (f)):
Md.Ann.Code. Bagby, 1924, Art. 5. §§ 2.">. 2ti: Mich.Court
Rules Ann.. Searl, i933, Rule 47, § 2; Miss.Sup.Ct.Rule
12, ltil Miss. 903. 90:>. 1931; N.J.Sup.Ct.Rules 131. 132,
147. 2 NJ.Misc. 1197. 124o-12f>l. 12.",;,. 1924; 2 N.D.
Comp.Laws Ann.. 191.3. § 7S44. as amended bv N.D.Laws
1927. ch. 214.
1916 AMENDMENT
Note to Subdivision <b>. With the time for appeal to a
circuit court of appeals reduced in general to 30 days by
the proposed amendment of Rule 73(a). the utility of the
original "except" clause, which permits a motion for a
new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence to
be made before the expiration of the time for appeal,
would have been seriously restricted. It was thought
advisable, therefore, to take care of this matter in another
way. By amendment of Rule ti0(b). newly discovered
evidence is made the basis for relief from a judgment,
and the maximum time limit has been extended to one
year. Accordingly the amendment of Rule f>9((>) eliminates the "except" clause and its specific treatment of
newly discovered evidence as a ground for a motion for
new trial. This ground remains, however, as a basis for a
motion for new trial served not later than 10 days after
the entry of judgment. See also Rule t>0(b).
als. M * Title 28 U.S.C.A.

RULES OF PRACTICE—DIST. AND CIR CT

Rule 2.9

movant's facts that are disputed. All material facts set forth in the statement
of the movant shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment
unless specifically controverted by the statement of the opposing party.
(f) Decision shall be rendered without a hearing unless requested by the
court, in which event the clerk shall set a date and time for such hearing.
(g) In all cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action
or any issues thereof on the merits with prejudice, the party resisting the
motion may request a hearing and such request shall be granted unless the
motion is summarily denied. If no such request is made within ten (10) days of
notice to submit for decision, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed waived.
(h) Provided, however, that any district court and any circuit court by order
of the judge or judges of the court may exclude that court from the operation of
this Rule 2.8 in which case an alternative procedure shall be prescribed by
written administrative order or rule.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Estate of Kav, 705 P 2d 1165 (Utah
1985*

Rule 2.9. Written orders, judgments, and decrees.
fa) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or parties obtaining the
ruling shall within fifteen (15» days, or within shorter time as the court may
direct, file with the court a proposed order, judgment or decree in conformity
with the ruling.
<b> Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and or orders shall be served
on opposing counsel before being presented to the court for signature unless
the court otherwise orders. Notice of objections thereto shall be submitted to
the court and counsel within (5) days after service.
(c) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall be reduced to writing and
presented to the court for signature within fifteen (15> days of the settlement
and dismissal.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Applicability
Signature of court
—Timing
Cited
Applicability.
This Rule and its requirements are binding
only upon counsel, not upon the trial court
Tolboe Constr Co v Staker Paving & Constr
Co . 882 P 2 d 843 UHah 1984>
Signature of court.

prior to plaintiffs submission of objections and
prior to the expiration of five days from the
service of the documents did not constitute a
violation of thi^ rule Tolboe Constr Co v
Staker Paving & Constr C o , 682 P 2d ^43
(I'tah 19M'

—Timing.
The fact that the court signed the documents

Cited in Larsen v Larsen, 674 P.2d 116
(Utah 1983)

555

